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JUDICIAL RATIONALIZATIONS FOR
RATIONING JUSTICE: HOW SIXTH
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE UNDERMINES
REFORM
Bruce A. Green*
As Deborah Rhode describes, the quality of representation in
criminal cases does not live up to the popular perception.' Most
defendants have too little money to hire a lawyer of their own
choosing. Therefore, a court ordinarily will appoint one, either from a
public defender's office or from the private bar. Many public
defenders carry onerous case loads. Many lawyers appointed from the
private bar receive a flat fee or an hourly rate that is capped, and are
therefore motivated to limit the amount of time spent on any
individual case. Either way, Rhode concludes, the underfinancing of
defense representation ensures that "overburdened and
underprepared lawyers strike hasty plea bargains for indigent clients
with no realistic alternatives."'
No one would suggest that equal justice requires everyone accused
of a crime to be defended by a Clarence Darrow or an Edward
Bennett Williams. But the criminal justice system fails to measure up
to societal expectations of fairness and equality if, as Rhode suggests,
defendants are pleading guilty because of their lawyers' careless
advice or inability to find time for a meaningful defense. That is not
equal justice but what Learned Hand might have referred to as
"rationed justice."3
Rhode notes that courts may provide a remedy when individual
defendants are poorly represented, whether because their lawyers are
inadequately funded or for other reasons;4 however, even in cases
where the defendant elects to go to trial, courts are generally reluctant
to exercise their authority under the Sixth Amendment to overturn
* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics.
1. See Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice 60-64 (2000).
2. Id. at 61.
3. Learned Hand, 75th Anniversary Address to the Legal Aid Society of New
York (Feb. 16, 1951) ("If we are to keep our democracy there must be one
commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice.")
4. Rhode, supra note 1, at 62-63.
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convictions based on the ineffective assistance of defense counsel.'
This is understandable. Courts have an interest in conserving
resources that otherwise would be expended on additional
proceedings. They seek to be fair to the prosecution, whose ability to
try a defendant successfully may diminish with the passage of time.
They seek the respect of a public that may perceive that criminals are
let loose because of technicalities.
Courts are particularly reluctant to overturn convictions stemming
from guilty pleas. A guilty plea is seen as an admission that removes
doubts about whether the defendant is guilty. Judges are suspicious of
defendants who complain about the fairness of their guilty plea after
being sentenced. They see this as an attempt to manipulate the
criminal justice process by defendants who initially took the risk that
they would fare better by pleading guilty than by standing trial and
then, after seeing the result, concluded that they had made the wrong
decision. Most significantly, there is the problem of sheer volume.
The overwhelming majority of cases are resolved by guilty plea.
Reviewing a significant number of those convictions, much less
overturning them, would greatly burden the courts. There are, thus,
enormous institutional pressures to resist challenges to convictions
that resulted from guilty pleas-even in cases where defendants in fact
got a raw deal.
If there were adequate judicial oversight and an adequate judicial
remedy when lawyers perform poorly, there might be less need for
institutional measures, such as better funding and better training, to
reduce the incidence of bad lawyering. But the problem with the
judicial doctrine based on the Sixth Amendment right to competent
counsel is not simply that it is toothless and thus makes institutional
reform more urgent. The judicial doctrine affirmatively impedes the
progress of reform by making light of bad lawyers and bad lawyering.
While reformers such as Rhode seek to persuade the public that bad
lawyering is a problem that affects the quality of criminal justice, the
courts, driven by other institutional interests, convey the opposite
impression.
I have previously discussed one aspect of Sixth Amendment
doctrine that is counter-factual in this way.6 Decisions presume that
any lawyer is qualified to defend someone accused of a crime-a legal
fiction that, in death penalty cases, can be lethal. Outside the context
of Sixth Amendment case law, in contrast, it is well recognized that
lawyers are generally unqualified to practice in unfamiliar areas of the
law. Litigation is an area of specialization, and criminal litigation in
particular requires special knowledge, training, and experience. By
5. Id.
6. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 433 (1993).
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promoting the idea that any lawyer can defend a criminal case, courts
undermine efforts to persuade legislatures of the need to provide
sufficient funding to support a corps of experienced criminal defense
lawyers.
Another body of Sixth Amendment case law provides an even more
serious impediment to reform by purveying the notion that bad
lawyering rarely makes a difference in the overwhelming majority of
criminal cases-that is, in cases that end in a guilty plea. The main
culprit here is the requirement that defendants show that they were
adversely affected by their lawyers' bad advice, and the cases
interpreting and applying this requirement. The theme of this case
law is that the quality of legal advice rarely makes a difference,
because defendants will plead guilty whether their lawyers' advice is
good or bad. This presupposition impedes efforts by reformers like
Rhode to show that inadequate funding leads to slipshod lawyering,
ill-advised plea bargains, and, ultimately, unjust results.
When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of plea
bargaining in 1970, it recognized that, to make an intelligent guilty
plea, a defendant must receive competent advice from an attorney7
While a conviction resting on a plea of guilty is not defective simply
because, in hindsight, the attorney's advice was wrong, the Court held
that a conviction could be challenged when the attorney's advice fell
outside "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases." 8  Fifteen years later, however, the Court qualified the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to competent advice of counsel.
Building upon its decision the previous term in Strickland v.
Washington,9 which announced the standard governing claims of
incompetent trial representation," the Court held that a defendant
who pleaded guilty after receiving substandard legal advice must show
a reasonable probability that he was "prejudiced."" In other words,
he must show "that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 2
When a defendant challenges a lawyer's trial representation, the
court can ordinarily dispose of the claim without a hearing by
concluding that the lawyer's work was reasonably competent. Even if,
in hindsight, the lawyer appears to have performed poorly, many
mistakes can be justified as the product of a reasonable strategic
judgment. Not so, however, when a defendant complains of an ill-
advised decision to plead guilty. Once the defendant shows that his
7. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,769-70 (1970).
8. Id. at 771.
9. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10. Id at 687-96.
11. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52.58-59 (1985).
12. Id. at 59.
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lawyer provided erroneous or incomplete advice,'13 the apparent error
or omission can rarely be justified as tactical or strategic. Is there a
"tactical" reason to misadvise a client about the benefits of a guilty
plea; for example, is there ever a reason to grossly understate the
length of the prison sentence that would or could be imposed if the
defendant pleaded guilty14 or the amount of time the defendant would
have to serve in prison before being eligible for parole?" Is there a
"strategic" reason not to explain the significant consequences of a
guilty plea, such as that, in the case of a non-citizen, the conviction
may lead to deportation? 6 Why would a defense lawyer, having failed
to conduct rudimentary investigation, persuade the defendant to plead
guilty by exaggerating the strength of the prosecution's case? 7
Of course, not every claim of bad advice is genuine, and most guilty
pleas are not the product of bad advice. But erroneous and
incomplete advice will be given with some frequency when criminal
defense lawyers with too little time to allocate to each case have an
incentive to push their clients to plead guilty. In the guilty plea cases,
therefore, the courts have a powerful institutional incentive to
minimize the significance of bad lawyering. Courts do so in a variety
of ways, relying at times on dubious assumptions about criminal
defense lawyers, criminal defendants, and the criminal process.
Consider the following eight examples.
First, the Supreme Court has authorized courts to dismiss these
constitutional claims out of hand if the defendant, while alleging that
his lawyer gave incomplete or wrong advice, failed additionally to
allege that he would have gone to trial if he had received complete or
correct advice." The underlying premise appears to be that bad
advice ordinarily does not affect the defendant's decision whether to
plead guilty, and that, therefore, if a convicted defendant does not
allege otherwise, it is fair to presume that he would have pleaded
guilty regardless of how he was counseled. Of course, this
presumption overlooks the greater likelihood that the omission is
13. In general, there is a strong presumption that the defense lawyer provided
competent representation, and therefore a defendant has a difficult evidentiary
burden to show that the lawyer's advice was in fact erroneous or incomplete. See, e.g.,
Slevin v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 2d 348,356-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
14. See, e.g., Ventura v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1992); Iaea v. Sunn, 800
F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986).
15. See, e.g., Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d 120, 121 (8th Cir. 1991); Sparks v.
Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988); Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 (5th Cir.
1987).
16. See, e.g., People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1991); Mott v. State, 407
N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1987).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Giardino, 797 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1986);
Commonwealth v. Chetwynde, 574 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
18. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985); see, e.g., United States v. Home, 987
F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Harris, 894 F. Supp. 20, 24 (D.D.C.
1995). Contra Chetwynde, 574 N.E.2d at 411.
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simply a pleading error.' 9 A defendant who complains that his lawyer
wrongly advised him to plead guilty may think it obvious that he
would have gone to trial if he had been properly counseled-
otherwise, why would he now ask for the chance to withdraw his guilty
plea?
Second, courts dismiss these claims when the defendant failed to
produce "objective evidence" that the lawyer's bad advice affected his
decision. This requirement presupposes that, leading up to a guilty
plea, a defendant will generally express how he is making the decision
to plead guilty and, in particular, the defendant will explain and
memorialize precisely what weight he is giving to different aspects of
counsel's advice or non-advice. Absent such an expression, which
survives in some provable form after the defendant has pled guilty, it
may therefore be presumed that the defendant's decision-making was
unaffected by what the lawyer did or did not do. The problem, of
course, is that defendants are unlikely to articulate their decision-
making processes, much less to memorialize them. The decision
whether to plead guilty vill be subjective and largely internal.
Third, courts may dismiss these claims if the defendant, responding
to the trial judge's questions at the guilty plea proceeding, expressed
satisfaction with his lawyer's representation.2' The theory is either
that the defendant's later complaint must be contrived or that the
defendant was, in any event, satisfied to receive bad advice and
therefore was not harmed. The theory is questionable, not only
because the defendant may have been unaware of the defense
lawyer's inadequacy at the time of the guilty plea, but because the
guilty plea proceeding is hardly conducive to getting a straight answer
about whether the defendant is pleased with his attorney's assistance.
The proceeding often takes place hurriedly and pro forma; the
defense attorney's presence makes it hard for the defendant candidly
to criticize him; a defendant who has decided to plead guilty has little
19. See Sepulveda v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (D.N.J. 1999)
(construing pro se complaint liberally and examining merits of the claim even though
defendant failed to allege that he would have elected to go to trial but for counsel's
alleged errors).
20. See, e.g., Moses v. United States, No. 97-3938, 1999 WL 195675 (8th Cir. Apr.
2, 1999) (per curiam); Fields v. Attorney Gen. of Md., 956 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (4th Cir.
1992); Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991); Diaz v. United States, 930
F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Smith, 888 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1989);
Slevin v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 2d 348,360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Green v. Johnson,
46 F. Supp. 2d 614, 623 n.14 (N.D. Tex. 1999). But see Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d
120, 121 (8th Cir. 1991) (crediting attorney's testimony that defendant said he wanted
to get out to see his children grow up).
21. See, e-g., Fields, 956 F.2d at 1299; Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1131 (lth
Cir. 1991); Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 983 (1st Cir. 1989);
United States v. Rivera Martinez, 693 F. Supp. 1358, 1364-65 (D.P.R. 1988). But see
Giardino, 797 F.2d at 32.
2002] 1733
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
incentive to complicate or scuttle the guilty plea proceeding by
interjecting concerns about counsel's performance.
Fourth, courts hold that the defense lawyer's erroneous advice does
not matter as long as, at the guilty plea proceeding, the judge
accurately advised the defendant on the same subject.2 For example,
it does not matter that the lawyer overstated the sentence that the
defendant would face after trial or understated the sentence he would
receive after a guilty plea, as long as the judge gave a proper
explanation at the guilty plea proceeding. The assumption must be
that the defendant heard and understood what the judge said,
understood that the judge's advice was inconsistent with the defense
lawyer's earlier advice, made a quick recalculation of the risks and
benefits of pleading guilty (without a lawyer's counsel regarding this
new decision), and resolved to plead guilty, while continuing to listen
to the judge's additional advice and to answer the judge's further
questions.
This reasoning ignores any number of alternative explanations for
the defendant's failure to say, after hearing the judge's advice, that he
no longer wants to plead guilty. Perhaps the defendant did not
understand and recognize the significance of what the judge told him,
because his lawyer prepared him to answer by rote or because the
judge's litany numbed him into answering reflexively. Perhaps the
defendant did not recognize the inconsistency between the lawyer's
advice and the judge's advice. For example, he may have understood
that, when the lawyer advised him that he faced no more than ten
years' imprisonment if he pled guilty, and the judge later said he faced
a sentence of up to thirty years' imprisonment, the lawyer had been
talking about the realistic maximum while the judge was merely
speaking theoretically. The defendant may have recognized the
inconsistency but, having come this far, and with the proceeding
moving rapidly, he may not have understood that he could back out or
he may have felt that he was being swept away in some fashion. It
may be that, had he been given the chance to discuss the decision with
counsel after receiving correct information, the defendant would have
made a considered decision to stand trial.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 169 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1995); Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d
1047, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994); Ventura v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 1048, 1058 (2d Cir.
1992); Chichakly v. United States, 926 F.2d 624, 631 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1991); Doganiere
v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d
1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990); Sepulveda, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (citing case law to support
"[t]he established.., rule.., that where an adequate guilty plea hearing has been
conducted, an erroneous prediction or assurance by defense counsel regarding the
likely sentence does not constitute grounds for invalidating a guilty plea on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel"). But see Risher v. United States, 992 F.2d 982 (9th
Cir. 1993). Likewise, a court may find there was no prejudice when the defense
lawyer's erroneous advice was contradicted by the pre-sentence report. E.g., Key v.
United States, 806 F.2d 133, 139 (7th Cir. 1987).
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Fifth, courts find that a defendant is not prejudiced when his
lawyer's miscalculation of the amount of prison time the defendant
faced if he stood trial, or similar misunderstandings, led to the
lawyer's possible failure to negotiate a more favorable plea bargain? 3
It is not enough for a defendant to argue that he would have gotten a
better deal; he must prove that, but for counsel's errors, he would
have gone to trial. Perhaps the courts are implying that defendants
are not really "prejudiced" when defense counsel's errors lead to a
harsher penalty. But, of course, the severity of the sentence is
enormously significant. Alternatively, the assumption may be that
prosecutors are immoveable: defense lawyers can say nothing to
influence a prosecutor's plea offer. The reality, of course, is quite the
contrary. Prosecutors look to defense lawyers for information and
arguments on which to base the prosecutor's charging or plea
bargaining decision.24 Therefore, when the defense lawyer is laboring
under a significant misunderstanding, it is quite possible that he will
be less effective in advocating with the prosecution for a result that
mitigates the harshness of the criminal conviction.
Sixth, courts assume that a lawyer's erroneous advice was
insignificant when there were other persuasive considerations-
including, especially, the strength of the prosecution's case-that
would have led a reasonable defendant to plead guilty even if defense
counsel had not erred.' By presupposing that a defendant, being
reasonable, will plead guilty when the case against him is strong, these
decisions come close to imposing a requirement that defendants show
that they are innocent, or that they would have secured an acquittal at
trial, in order to overturn a guilty plea..26  The problem is that
defendants do not necessarily make rational decisions whether to
plead guilty-weighing the most important considerations and
discounting the least important ones. The decision is individual,
subjective, and idiosyncratic. Bad advice that would not matter to the
hypothetical "reasonable defendant" may matter to the actual, flesh-
and-blood defendant.
23. See, eg., Gargano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886, 889-91 (7th Cir. 1988); see
also Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297-98; Craker v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986).
For a rare example where this hurdle was overcome, see Mask v. McGinnis, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 122, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting prosecutor's testimony that he would have
made a more favorable plea offer if defense counsel had told him that the defendant
was not a persistent violent felony offender).
24. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117 (1998).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Home, 987 F.2d 833, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United
States v. Hoskins, 910 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1990); Hale v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545,
550 (8th Cir. 1990); Williams v. Smith, 888 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1989); Gargano, 852
F.2d at 891; United States v. Harris, 894 F. Supp. 20, 24-25 (D.D.C. 1995); People v.
Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1991); People v. Hughes, 580 N.E.2d 179, 181 (111.
App. Ct. 1991). But see Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1991).
26. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1985).
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Seventh, courts often assume that information concerning certain
consequences of a conviction is inherently unimportant to a
defendant. In particular, courts assume that defendants do not care
about, and therefore do not have to be correctly advised about,
consequences that, unlike the sentence to be imposed, are indirect or
"collateral," such as that the defendant will lose his employment or
livelihood or be deported after pleading guilty,27 or that the conviction
may be used to enhance the defendant's sentence if he is convicted of
a future offense.2  Here, again, is a generalization about how
defendants make decisions that just may not be true in particular
cases. It is easy to imagine that some defendants would elect to stand
trial in order to prevent the loss of their livelihood or deportation,
even at risk of a more substantial prison sentence if convicted after
trial.
Lastly, courts assume that erroneous predictions about the sentence
that will be imposed similarly do not matter, even when defense
counsel seems certain about the prediction.2 9 The assumption appears
to be that, because sentencing is indeterminate and defense counsel
obviously cannot guarantee a particular sentence, defendants do not
take their lawyers' predictions into account but only consider the
maximum sentence that may be imposed under the law. This
assumption is unrealistic, however, because a lawyer's prediction may
be the most important factor in a defendant's decision. There is no
reason for a defendant to ignore the lawyer's prediction simply
27. The majority of decisions hold that defense counsel need not advise about the
deportation consequences of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202
F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant may not withdraw guilty plea
where defense counsel failed to warn of risk of deportation); United States v.
Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1985); Taveras-
Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598 (M.D. Pa. 2000); State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960
(Fla. 1987); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1987); Commonwealth v. Frometa,
555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989). But see State v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987); Daley v.
State, 487 A.2d 320 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Lyons v. Pearce, 694 P.2d 969 (Or.
1985). See generally Timothy B. Jafek, Note, Non-Citizens, Guilty Pleas, and
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under the Arizona Constitution, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 549
(2000); Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Different: Noncitizens and
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 741 (2001).
28. See, e.g., Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315,324-26 (Iowa 1986).
29. See, e.g., Ventura v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 1048, 1058 (2d Cir. 1992); Chichakly
v. United States, 926 F.2d 624, 631 n.12 (7th Cir. 1991); Doganiere v. United States,
914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th
Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Messer, 647 F. Supp. 704, 708 (D. Mont. 1986).
Some decisions dispense with claims that the attorney erroneously predicted what
sentence the defendant would receive under the first prong of the Strickland
standard-that is, they hold that bad predictions are not unreasonable. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martinez, 169 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1999) ("In this circuit, an
attorney's 'mere inaccurate prediction of a sentence' does not demonstrate the
deficiency component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.") (citing prior
cases).
1736 [Vol. 70
JUDICIAL RATIONALIZATIONS
because it may prove wrong. Lawyers in many areas of practice are
employed precisely because of their ability to predict the legal
consequences of a client's proposed conduct. No one can demand
that every prediction be borne out, but it is fair for a defendant to
assume that a lawyer's prediction is reasonable.
As these examples suggest, judges are pushed in opposite
directions. Judges recognize that people accused of a crime should be
competently represented. They give expression to this principle, at
least as an ideal, in case law that generally recognizes a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. Outside the context of specific
cases, some judges also work personally to promote the improvement
of institutional processes for providing competent lawyers or to assist
in programs to improve professional practice. At the same time,
however, courts are motivated by other institutional interests to limit
the cases in which they must overturn guilty pleas because of the
defense lawyer's incompetence.3 They have done so in a manner that
frustrates efforts to achieve the ideal of competent representation, by
developing case law that essentially denies the importance of
competent representation for defendants individually and for the
achievement of justice generally. 1 While legislatures ration justice by
failing adequately to fund the provision of lawyers for the poor in
criminal cases, courts provide handy rationalizations for doing so.
30. The remedy is generally reserved for only the most egregious cases of
erroneous representation in connection with the decision whether to plead guilty. See,
e.g., United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 1998) (lawyer grossly
underestimated potential maximum sentence if defendant was convicted at trial);
Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1996) (lawyer never discussed advisability
of guilty plea).
31. Perhaps it is possible to limit ineffective assistance claims without denying the
prevalence and significance of bad lawyering. Courts might say, frankly, that bad
lawyering may often matter, but often it will not, and it is difficult to ascertain after
the fact whether it did or did not. Because of the burden of overturning guilty pleas
whenever a lawyer's advice was substandard, relief will be limited to cases where
defense counsel's assistance was not merely outside the range of ordinary
competence, but exceptionally so, such that there was a reasonable probability that
the bad advice would have affected the decision making of a reasonable person in the
defendant's position. See Bruce A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1053 (1980). This standard would
allow courts to develop a jurisprudence in which incompetent representation and its
potential impact were acknowledged, even if the availability of a judicial remedy
remained circumscribed.
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